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The main purpose of this paper is to use the Spanish case, through an eco-
nometric analysis of 226 electoral polls, to explain why polls are making
more mistakes in times of great socioeconomic slumps, political instability
and the emergence of new political parties. In this context, it is the very ins-
trument with which society tries to reduce the reigning uncertainty that, pa-
radoxically, can ultimately drive uncertainty up. Our results show that the
prediction error for the new emerging parties is significantly higher than for
the traditional parties and this error is not sensitive to solutions for incre-
asing the reliability of surveys, such as increasing sample size, transparency
constantly conducting periodical surveys, the closeness of the approa-
ching election or the survey mode that is used. It can be observed that polls-
ters do not want to make predictions that vary greatly from the average of
the other polls. Finally, editorial bias appears to play a significant role, es-
pecially in the case of traditional parties.
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A ccording to Castillo-Manzano et al. (2017), a pattern of electoral volatilityand transformation can be observed in the European countries that have suf-fered most from the social consequences of the economic crisis and requiredEU intervention, such as Greece, Portugal and Spain [Camacho et al. (2018),García Serrano, (2011)]. First, a change of government, with the party that
was in opposition at the beginning of the crisis coming out on top. Then, during the
second phase, when the economic crisis did not abate, disaffection with politics, or
anti-politics [Clarke, (2015)], sprang up, triggering the emergence of new political
parties that have variously been defined as European insurgent (ECFR, 2016) or pop-
ulist [Hameleers et al. (2017)] parties.
In line with the above, during the first phase in 2011, in the wake of the strict
economic adjustment plan passed by the socialist government (PSOE) in 2010, the
E
ARevista de Economía Aplicada Número 78 (vol. XXVI), 2018, págs. 81 a 97
81
People’s Party (PP), which had up until that moment been the leading opposition
party, gained an absolute majority in the Congress (lower house) [Chari, (2013)].
However, the turning point in Spanish political life in recent years was marked
by the Spanish elections to the European Parliament in 2014. The pre-election fore-
casts made by polls were badly wrong [Bandera, (2016)]. Between them, the two
main parties shed more than 5 million votes, while two new emerging parties
erupted onto the political scene.
First, Podemos [Casero-Ripollés et al. (2016), Chadwick and Stromer-Galley,
(2016)], which won more than one million votes and became the fourth largest party
in Spain. Podemos stated that it was a party whose intention was to encompass the
whole political spectrum and so, in the party’s own words, to move on from the “old”
dialectic between left and right. However, the truth is that what the party proposed only
resulted in it being perceived as a wholly leftist party and for the European Council
on Foreign Relations (ECFR, 2016), Podemos is an insurgent left-wing party. Second,
a centre-right party, Ciudadanos (C’s), which made the leap from Catalonian regional
politics [see Bosch and Espasa, (2014) and Comerford et al. (2014), as contrasting ex-
amples of the current complexity of Catalonian Politics] to national politics with al-
most 500,000 votes. Ciudadanos originally defined itself as a social democratic party,
although it has now (2017) changed its definition in the party statutes to liberal. Both
new parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos, subsequently consolidated their positions in
the 24 May 2015 regional and local elections [Rodon and Hierro, (2016)].
The following elections, held on 20 December 2015 (referred to as 20-D), pro-
duced an unprecedented outcome in recent Spanish democratic history: four political
parties each received over 10 % of the valid votes cast, yet none obtained 30 %. The
parties were unable to form a government in this multiparty scenario, forcing a rerun
of the elections six months later, on 26 June 2016 (26-J), and dealing another blow to
the already turbulent national political situation [Castillo-Manzano et al. (2017)].
The repeat of the elections, distrust in political parties –due as much to their not
keeping their electoral promises as to corruption scandals– new emerging/insurgent
parties and new candidates (three of the four main candidates for the post of prime
minister were running for the first time in the 20-D elections) produced new cir-
cumstances and increased the electorate’s volatility, with polls of voting intention pre-
senting constantly changing scenarios.
On both 20-D and 26-J, once the polling stations had closed both the surveys con-
ducted during the election campaign and the exit polls were seen to have been sys-
tematically wrong, especially in their predictions for the emerging parties. In the first
election campaign (20-D), the polls indicated that the PP would get the most votes but
did not go so far as to predict whether it would get a large enough majority to form a
government, and second and third places were highly contested in the polls (Orriols
and Cordero, 2016). To be more specific, the 20-D election results showed that the sur-
veys had generally underestimated the number of votes that would be cast for the PP
and Podemos, while greatly overestimating those that would be cast for Ciudadanos.
The 26-J polls once again badly miscalculated by underestimating the winning
party, the PP, while on this occasion giving greater voting intention to an emerging
party, the alliance between Podemos (“We Can”) and the old Izquierda Unida (“the
United Left”). Running together as Unidos Podemos (“United We Can”), the alliance
Revista de Economía Aplicada
82
ended up in third place behind the PP and the PSOE (Socialist Party), preventing what
had been termed a sorpasso (Italian, meaning “outflanking” or “overtaking”) in the
political press.
These systematic errors in the Spanish polls, especially after the onset of the great
recession, are not an isolated case in geographic terms. The US is a good illustration.
In the US, the pre-election polls have worked quite well in the past; for example, the
Bush victory and his winning margin over Kerry [Pickup and Johnston, (2008), Trau-
gott, (2005)] were correctly predicted in 2004. The same was true of the 2008 presi-
dential election, with the Obama victory over his Republican opponent McCain
[Panagopoulos (2009)]. However, there has been an increasing number of sizable pre-
diction errors in recent years; for example, in 2012, support for the Republican Rom-
ney was overestimated [Panagopoulos and Farrer, (2014)] and, more recently, in 2016,
the polls were biased toward the Democratic candidate, Clinton [Anuta et al. (2017)].
Modern elections are characterized by the ubiquity of polls [Wei et al. (2011)],
despite the criticism that they have received. In most countries there are many or-
ganizations that conduct polls, from newspapers to other media groups, not to men-
tion think tanks, universities and dedicated market research companies [Panagopou-
los and Farrer, (2014)]. However, these days pre-election and exit pollsters face major
challenges, such as their procedures, including the estimation of likely voters, and
technological advances that have paved the way to internet-based and interactive
voice response polls. Such features require greater information to be provided about
survey methods and the consequences that they might have on estimations, in order
not only to maintain trust in the surveys themselves, but also in the transparency of
the election process [Traugott, (2005)]. It is important for a society to believe in polls
for, as Tremayne (2015) states, when part of the population sees that the polls into
which they have put their trust have not been fulfilled, there can be accusations of
voter fraud or political trickery and, ultimately, the foundations of the democratic sys-
tem itself can be questioned.
Following Price and Stroud (2005), the credibility of polls lies in people believing
that they are reasonably accurate soundings of popular opinion. There are several fac-
tors that impact the accuracy of polls and, therefore, their credibility. On the one hand,
there are the technical characteristics and survey design. However, the difference be-
tween electoral predictions and results cannot simply be put down to a statistical er-
ror, but derive from sample design, question formulation, weighting, and screening
[Pickup and Johnston, (2008)]. Second, there is the behavior of the respondents them-
selves. Not everybody is willing to state their voting intention to pollsters, whether
due to reasons of confidentiality or privacy [Kim et al. (2011)] or simply because they
are undecided or do not want to show which way they are going to vote. However,
the votes of the undecided and the hidden vote are not always uniformly distributed
among voters for the different parties and this could generate a problem of selection
bias, which would also distort the survey [Urquizu-Sancho, (2006)]. In addition, re-
spondents’ distrust of a survey is a process that feeds into itself. A negative percep-
tion or lack of faith in pre-election polls can lead citizens to lose their appetite for be-
ing poll respondents, which then affects the accuracy of the polls, and this would
consequently increase the negative perception or lack of trust even more in the future.
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Lastly, a large part of the distrust in the pre-election polls is caused by the be-
lief that pollsters are trying to influence election outcomes [Price and Stroud,
2005)]. By this we mean a bias that comes from the very polling organizations or
companies themselves in surveys conducted or commissioned by media with a
clearly defined editorial line [Eveland and Shah, (2003)]. Given that poll results are
a core part of media coverage, the polls themselves often constitute electoral news
in the media [Roy et al. (2015)], especially given today’s demand for 24-hour news
[Rosenstiel, (2005)]. As such, any analysis should include the effects that the polit-
ical ideology of the company that commissions and/or conducts the polls might have
on the selection of polls that are written about, the details that are emphasized, and
the way that polling data are interpreted [Searles et al. (2016), Tremayne, (2015)].
For all these reasons, the main purpose of this paper is to utilize the Spanish case
study to explain why polls are making greater errors at a time when society and its
citizens want more from polls, i.e., in times of great economic slumps and political
instability, and the emergence of new political parties. The paper will, therefore, fo-
cus on the factors that might determine their level of accuracy in the last two gen-
eral elections (20-D and 26-J). In all the history of Spain’s present-day democracy,
the importance of voter expectation polls may well have peaked in the media dur-
ing the above-mentioned time period. When significant changes in voter intention
were announced, they quickly became front page news and the lead story in news
bulletins. The Spanish people watched on as Podemos was declared the leading po-
litical party-in-waiting by voter intention one month, and Ciudadanos the next, with
both outstripping the two great traditional parties. And yet, the two emerging par-
ties in fact came in 3rd and 4th in both elections.
In short, we shall seek to use the Spanish case to respond to a broad series of
questions such as, for example, whether polls are an efficient tool for reducing so-
cial uncertainty in precarious socioeconomic times when new political parties spring
up. Or, for revealing the factors that would enable us to reduce errors in the polls dur-
ing times of adversity like the current period. Other questions will also be addressed
with managerial implications for the media, such as what the optimal economic strat-
egy is in a context where the polls become front page news.
A earlier study of the Spanish case [Bandera, (2016)] examined the accuracy
of the polls in the 2014 European elections, the autonomous regional elections of
2015 and the local elections of 2015, highlighting, as commented previously, that
the first of these involved a change of cycle that none of the polling companies man-
aged to capture in their surveys of the public. As Buchanan (1986) states, when the
electorate is volatile, survey procedures based on experience in more stable situa-
tions may not work as well. It is therefore pertinent to analyze the accuracy of the
pre-election surveys conducted for the general elections of 2015 and 2016 and to as-
certain what the factors were that had influenced them, including, for the first time,
the political bias of the company commissioning and/or conducting the survey.
1. DATA AND METHOD
As commented above, the purpose of this paper is to measure the source of the
inaccuracy of the electoral polls, with inaccuracy of the polls understood as the dif-
ference between data prediction and reality.
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The initial data come from the compilation made by the El Mundo newspaper
(http://www.elmundo.es/grafico/espana/2015/10/15/561fe19422601dd7728b45ef.html),
which collected data from 24 companies, organizations and media for 222 electoral
polls between 6 January 2015 and 20 June 2016. Using this data we have looked up
the original sources and corrected various mistakes in the El Mundo database,
whilst also adding some new variables, such as the survey methods used. The data-
base has also been expanded to include two exit polls and two tracking polls (one
of each for the two elections) that were not published until the polling stations had
closed, as Spanish law prohibits the publication of survey data during the last five
days before ballots.
The El Mundo database was assumed to work with Unidos Podemos to stan-
dardize data in both the 20-D and 26-J elections, although this was a misrepresen-
tation of the truth, as the coalition only existed during the second election. With the
help of the original sources, we were able to recalculate all the mistakes made in the
first election and so allow for the fact that Podemos ran alone in the first election.
The indicators taken to measure inaccuracy as dependent variables were M3 and
M5, proposed by Panagopoulos and Farrer (2014) and based on Mosteller et al.
(1949). Specifically, M3 is the average absolute difference between the poll estimate
and the final election result for each party, while M5 compares the polled margin be-
tween the two main parties to the eventual outcome margin between the same par-
ties and returns the absolute value of the difference between these margins. To en-
rich the analysis, in our case we have extrapolated the M5 concept not only to the
main parties in the two elections, PP and PSOE, but have also calculated a specific
M5 for the two emerging parties, Podemos/Unidos Podemos and Ciudadanos. A to-
tal of six different dependent variables will be worked with, four of which are re-
lated to measuring M3, and the other two to measuring M5.
The following independent variables in our model are factors that might influ-
ence survey errors. Their choice is justified by the prior literature [Crespi, (1988),
Lau, (1994), Martin et al. (2005); Panagopoulos and Farrer, (2014)]:
a) Sample Size (Size). Whether the size of the sample might affect accuracy,
as we a priori think it might. With this variable we will also implicitly be evaluat-
ing the need for the media that commission polls to bear a high cost for them to be
conducted, as said cost should be closely correlated with sample size.
b) The way that the poll is conducted (Mode). Polls will be analyzed to deter-
mine whether they are based on face-to-face, telephone or online interviews. Current
technological advances have enabled the growth of online surveys due to their lower-
cost. In our case, we shall test whether the predominant mode, i.e., polls conducted
by telephone interview, provide some sort of advantage over other polling methods.
c) The lag between the survey and the day of the election (Number_days). It
can be assumed that the nearer the election date, the more certain respondents will
be about the party that they plan to vote for and less inaccurate the survey will be.
With this variable we are also testing the utility of polls at times when there are no
elections in the near future.
d) One particularity of this case, based on two general elections in Spain
within a period of only six months, is that we have considered it appropriate to in-
clude whether the polls were conducted for the first or second election process (Sec-
At a time of insurgent parties, can societies believe in election polls? The Spanish experience
85
ond_time). A priori the polls’ predictive ability should be expected to improve in the
second election process, as the recent real results for the new political parties are al-
ready available for a political election of the same type.
e) We shall also test the experience of the company conducting the surveys
through a variable that measures the number of polls that the company has conducted
in the period under consideration (Number_polls). A priori the greater experience of
the company should be expected to translate into a smaller prediction error in the polls.
f) As mentioned in the Introduction, the model also includes the possible ide-
ological bias of the outlet that has commissioned the survey and, obviously, dissem-
inated its results. A priori, this variable is especially relevant in the Spanish case [Van
Dalen, (2012), Vliegenthart and Mena Montes, (2014)], as the media, and especially
television, have played a major role in the rise of the new parties, Podemos and Ciu-
dadanos. In fact, for the first elections in which Podemos ran, the European elections
of 2014, instead of putting the party logo on the ballot papers, as all political parties
traditionally do, they used a photo of their leader, Pablo Iglesias, to draw on his me-
dia appeal, as he frequently appeared on television talk shows and other TV programs.
Media bias was obtained through an online survey campaign of a panel of Span-
ish university experts in social sciences, all of whom have numerous publications in
Scopus, especially in the political and economic sciences. Specifically, they were
asked whether the 24 different media outlets included in our analysis have a politi-
cal editorial bias toward supporting right-wing parties, left-wing parties, or whether
it was neutral, whilst also offering the option of “do not know/no answer”. We re-
ceived a total of 36 responses, four of which were ruled out as they lacked data, leav-
ing 32 valid results. The researchers in question stated that they originated from 11
of the 17 Spanish autonomous communities (regions), although 4 preferred not to
answer this question.
A very strict definition was used to define biases. An outlet was considered to
be biased toward one ideological wing or the other when responses indicating this
exceeded the sum of the responses indicating the opposite bias and any responses
indicating a neutral mid-ground. Based on this definition, only 15 of the 24 analyzed
outlets presented a clear ideological bias in their editorial line; 10 to the right, and
5 to the left. These results reveal that a set of media outlets exists in the Spanish po-
litical arena with a definite right-wing bias.
The variables Left_Bias and Right_Bias were calculated on the basis of the re-
sults of this process. The first variable, Left_Bias, is a dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 if the outlet that commissioned and disseminated the survey has a clear left-
wing ideological bias according to the expert panel; otherwise, it takes a value of 0
if there is no clear political bias. The Right_Bias variable is defined in the same way.
It is not easy to determine a priori the direction of the influence of these two
biases, Left and Right. It might be thought that outlets with a specific bias could at-
tempt to give some advantage to the results of parties close to their political way of
thinking in order to get onside voters who like to back the winner, or to underesti-
mate the results in order to mobilize a sympathetic, but possibly apathetic, electorate.
A strategy like this is based on the theory that voters cast their votes not only on the
basis of their preferences, but also their perceptions of the parties’ chances of win-
ning [Blais and Bodet, (2006)].
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Another important aspect is the role that Right Bias media have played with re-
gard to an emerging left-wing insurgent party like Podemos. Furthermore, there have
been frequent clashes and spats between the leaders of Podemos and some of the
journalists from these media. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Right Bias me-
dia have repeatedly defined Podemos as an anti-system populist party and have
flagged up some possible links between the party’s leaders and countries like Iran
and, especially, Venezuela. In spite of this, Podemos’ leaders have overcome all the
allegations leveled against them and investigations into the party allegedly receiv-
ing illegal funding from abroad.
g) Sampling_error. A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if electoral poll
i provides information about its sampling error and 0 otherwise. This variable is an
indicator not only of the quality and rigor with which the poll has been conducted
but also of its transparency. This also enables us to test the Mateos and Penadés
(2013) hypothesis that one of the key factors that explains the reliability of polls in
predicting the vote is not just the size of the poll but also its transparency.
h) Stock_Market. Also included as a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if elec-
toral poll i was commissioned by a media outlet or a news website with a parent firm
listed on the stock market, and 0 otherwise. This variable was included to enable us
to discriminate between the media that can a priori count on greater economic re-
sources, which would enable them to conduct rigorous polls.
i) Lastly, we have included a variable that seeks to quantify the influence of the
Environment, i.e., the influence that the results of contemporaneous polls have.
Table 1 provides a description of both the endogenous and explanatory variables
used, together with their descriptive statistics.
2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 2 presents the main results of the estimates. Specifically, each column is
a linear regression for a specific endogenous variable which is made explicit in the
column.
To test for any possible multicollinearity problems that might exaggerate esti-
mates of the variance parameter and distort its statistical significance, we have cal-
culated the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of the variables used in the empirical
analysis. The usual rule-of-thumb considered in econometric textbooks is 10, al-
though practitioners may use lower threshold values and a value of 5 is common. In
our case, the values of the VIFs are very low. Specifically, the average is 1.47 with
all values below 3. In fact, they are practically all below 2.
It is easy to observe (see Table 1) that when there are flourishing emerging par-
ties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos, election poll errors for these parties increase
exponentially, as can be seen in a comparison of, e.g., the value of the mean of
M3_Newi and the M3_Tradi variables, specifically 3.676% versus 2.324%. In some
models, especially No. VI, the constant has a quite persistent error that the polls have
to contend with in times of great uncertainty, as described in this paper. It was only
possible for this error to be moderated in the second election (Second_time variable).
In addition, and even more importantly, no optimal solution seems to exist that
would enable the polling companies to reduce these errors. Variables Size and Num-
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ber_polls are not significant for the emerging parties in models II and VI. This shows
that any survey is bound to be inaccurate when new options exist that command ma-
jor social support, irrespective of how many times the survey is repeated or how broad
the sample is.
These strategies are not very effective for the traditional parties, either. Although
the variable Size generally presents a negative sign as was expected (the greater the
survey sample size, the lower the error in the predictions), the only significant ef-
fects worth highlighting, at 5%, were in the measurement of traditional parties’ M5
(Model V) and also in M3_Righti (Model IV). The irrelevance of the sample size for
predicting election results was also noted by Bandera (2016), Crespi (1988), Lau
(1994), and Panagopoulos and Farrer (2014). In short, there seems to be no clear in-
centive for the media to undertake costly electoral polls with thousands of surveys.
The strategy followed by some media, of sharing the cost of polls in order to increase
the sample size, would also seem to be flawed. Only if said media are not compet-
ing for the same client (such as in the case of regional television stations), is it worth
their while to commission a joint poll. Otherwise, the optimal strategy for a media
outlet is to commission its own poll with few observations.
Meanwhile, the variable Number_polls is not significant for the traditional par-
ties, either, meaning that, to the contrary of what might have been anticipated, ex-
perience does not count for the parties that are already well-known. In other words,
if the methodology that a specific opinion poll company uses fails once, irrespec-
tive of the party in question, it will fail systematically.
The same is true for the variables Sampling_Errori and Stock_Marketi. Their
general lack of significance for both traditional and new parties strongly suggests that
neither greater technical quality, nor transparency, nor the availability a priori of
greater economic resources guarantee better predictions of the results.
Nonetheless, it would be a good strategy for traditional parties to conduct polls
nearer the election date, as the variable Number_days is relevant for M3 in model
I. As could be anticipated, surveys carried out as near to the election day as possi-
ble were those that were most correct. This result is in line with Crespi (1988), who
found that the accuracy of polls depended on scheduling them as close as possible
to the date of the election. However, it is also true that other studies find no signif-
icant impact of the timing of the poll on accuracy [Bandera, (2016), Lau, (1994),
Panagopoulos, (2009), Panagopoulos and Farrer, (2014)]
However, this strategy does not work for emerging parties (Model II and Model
VI), as prediction error is insensitive to the nearness of the date of the election. This
result once again highlights the difficulty that the polls have in predicting voters’ real
behavior in the face of these new parties. Not even the closeness of the election, i.e.,
when in theory the voters should have a clearer idea about which party they are go-
ing to vote for, helps to reduce uncertainty.
For new parties, the key lies in the variable Second_time
,
which is significant
in four of the six models. Focusing on the emerging parties, it could be said that the
only solution for reducing prediction errors for these parties is to hold some elec-
tions in advance and close in time, which is a highly unlikely scenario, as the Span-
ish case-with the election being repeated in under a year –is exceptional–. In short,
new parties have to stop being “new” for their prediction error to approach some-
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thing similar to that of traditional parties. Obviously, this means that polling com-
panies can use data on past voting behavior to correct sample biases and as a start-
ing point in their forecasting models.
In our case, the estimates tell us that the polls for the second election achieved
an immediate reduction of 0.675 percentage points in the mean error (M3) for the
new parties, whilst at the same time there was a 0.586 increase for the traditional par-
ties. As far as M5 is concerned, the error reduces even more, by -2.259 percentage
points. In short, when there are emerging parties in the mix, getting the real voting
intention right is a complicated matter, and it does not appear that polls are reduc-
ing this logical uncertainty. Only real elections help clarify the landscape.
In this regard, certain parallels exist between the great errors of Spanish polls
and those of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump [Chadwick and Stromer-Gal-
ley, (2016)]. In all three cases voters had to choose between brand new choices with
no recent precedent [Bachmann and Sidaway, (2016) on Brexit; in the case of the
US election, although he was running for the Republican Party, Trump was obviously
not a model of a conventional politician]. In other words, in scenarios with parties
and/or emerging political options, societies are condemned to swallow large doses
of uncertainty for which the polls offer no efficient solutions.
With respect to the other explanatory variables used, it can be concluded that,
first, there has been no greater accuracy shown by the use of telephone interviews
over other types of survey, such as face-to-face or online interviews, except in the
case of the M5 prediction for traditional parties (see variable Mode). This is in line
with what was observed in Panagopoulos and Farrer (2014) but unlike the results
found in Panagopoulos (2009), which showed that polls conducted via the Internet
were significantly less accurate than polls conducted by telephone. In short, this re-
sult supports the hypothesis that polling companies use whichever mode is cheap-
est for them as long as it guarantees that they obtain a real simple random sample.
Second, there seems to be a clear bias toward the average of preceding polls.
In fact, in practically all the estimated models, Environmenti is usually the main ex-
planatory variable. This result would indicate that pollsters present a certain con-
servative behavior in their predictions, bringing them more into line with what their
competitors present at the same moment in time.
Finally, editorial bias (Left_Bias and Right_Bias) appears to play a significant
role, especially in the case of traditional parties. It was the media with a clearly politi-
cized editorial line, especially those on the right-wing, that made the best M3 and
M5 predictions, especially for the traditional parties and for the parties on the right.
This result justifies the inclusion of this type of variable in the analysis as it would
ultimately be capturing the influence that the media have in individual countries.
It should be noted that all the correlations, whenever they exist (Models I, II,
IV and V), are always negative. That is to say, the political bias of the outlet reduces
the polling error in the case of both Left_Bias and Right_Bias. This result could serve
as indirect confirmation that the media apparently do not deliberately or systemat-
ically implement any clearly biased practices to tamper with the electoral poll results
in order to favor parties with the same ideology.
Whatever the case, a future line of research would be to find explanations for
this minor prediction error of biased media. One possible hypothesis might be that
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the variables Left_Bias and Right_Bias are really capturing some specific charac-
teristics of the media other than their ideological bias in the Spanish case. It is no-
ticeable that many of the most eminent media, with the most experience and, above
all, with the most human and economic resources (such as ABC, Antena 3, El Mundo,
La Vanguardia and SER) are among those that have been identified as ideologically
biased by the panel of experts that we have employed.
3. CONCLUSION
Leaving aside the initial instability from the late 1960’s until the failed coup d’é-
tat in 1981, the Great Recession that began in 2008 has been the main challenge 
that Spanish democracy has had to face. In this context of economic, social and po-
litical crisis, polls have become immensely important, as they are, theoretically, the 
instrument that should attempt to mitigate the political uncertainty that quickly spread 
with the emergence of new political parties trying to challenge the traditional two-
party system.
However, the polls offered significantly different results month on month, even 
changing the most voted party, and even offering implausible technical links among 
the four main parties, right up to a month before the election. To this must be added 
their lack of success in predicting the final election results. For all these reasons, their 
real utility was called into question even further, and this did not exactly improve trust 
in the Spanish political system.
Following Fisher et al. (2011), the proliferation of electoral poll data should make 
us rigorously assess what we can learn about the results of an election from voter in-
tention polls. The present paper has therefore sought to explain their lack of success 
in the Spanish case through an econometric analysis of 226 electoral polls, and has 
attempted to define some recommendations that would enable an optimal strategy to 
be determined for such polls when the situation is one of absolute uncertainty.
Unfortunately, the findings have shown that reducing the electoral polls’ mar-
gin of error is a difficult proposition in such a volatile context. The prediction error 
for the new emerging parties is significantly higher than for the traditional parties. 
And what is even worse, this error in the estimation of the new parties is not sensi-
tive to solutions for increasing the reliability of surveys, such as increasing sample 
size, transparency or constantly conducting periodical surveys. Not even the close-
ness of the approaching election significantly reduces this error. Only when the 
emerging parties are no longer “new” will it be possible to reduce this error, i.e., when 
they have taken part in similar elections (and, it appears, different types of elections 
are not enough, since in 2015 Podemos had taken part in two elections only a few 
months before the general election of 20-D: European and municipal-regional elec-
tions, to be precise). Be that as it may, it is only fair to recognize the technical dif-
ficulty involved in a poll being able to predict the emergence of new social phe-
nomena (such as new parties). However, when they are out there, polls nevertheless 
seem to do a good job of learning how to predict their vote share, even if they still 
make better predictions for traditional parties.
On the other hand, the determinants of the reliability of the predictions for tra-
ditional parties do follow a pattern that is more consistent with what is stated in the
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prior literature. To begin with, the predictions in this case are, on average, a little more
reliable and sensitive to sample size and to the time remaining until the election.
Other general conclusions of this study are, first, the utility of including the me -
dium’s editorial bias, even though, once more, it influences mostly predictions for tra-
ditional parties. Second, the apparent lack of utility of the strategy that many media fol-
low of systematically making predictions every so often. In other words, this greater
experience (and economic cost) does not translate into greater trustworthiness, although
it might generate more original headlines that are not available to the competition, as
only the outlet that commissions the poll can exclusively disseminate the results.
In fact, this is a phenomenon that feeds into itself and creates a vicious circle.
The political uncertainty derived from the crisis and the new parties leads citizens
to crave more electoral polls. The media see a good business opportunity in this need.
They have many polls carried out, with differing results that change in the short term
and which are not very accurate compared to the real results, which contributes to
generating greater uncertainty and a greater lack of trust in the system. And this, in
turn, generates further social uncertainty, which leads to a greater demand for polls.
In this context, it is the very instrument with which society tries to reduce the
reigning uncertainty that, paradoxically, can ultimately drive uncertainty up. There-
fore, the best recommendation is that the media that present the polls should stress
their limitations when new parties and a severe socio-economic crisis are involved.
This would prevent unfounded expectations of their reliability and, above all, shocks
to society for no apparent real reason.
The best service that opinion poll companies and the media that contract them
can offer society is to modestly acknowledge the limitations of their electoral polls.
It can be observed that pollsters also seem to present clear risk aversion behavior,
in the sense that they do not want to make predictions that vary greatly from the av-
erage of the other polls. This strategy must be defensive in part as, even if the aver-
age is wrong, reputational blame can be avoided if all the other pollsters also fail.
To conclude, these results also have implications for epistemology in the social
sciences. On occasion the results of the polls are used as a dependent variable in mod-
els [Guiso et al. (2017), for example, where they are used to measure the increase
in populism in Europe] under the assumption that they reliably represent society’s
political preferences at any given point in time. It would be desirable for these mod-
els to include some kind of correction that would take into account the fact that the
reliability of results diminishes with the emergence of new vibrant political parties
[Welch, (2002) on disclosing essential information about polls].
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RESUMEN
El principal objetivo de este artículo es explicar por qué las encuestas elec-
torales cometen más errores en épocas de crisis económica, inestabilidad
política y con partidos emergentes como Podemos y Ciudadanos. Para ello
utilizamos una base de datos de 226 encuestas previas a las elecciones ge-
nerales españolas de 2016. En este contexto, paradójicamente vemos como
el instrumento que la sociedad utiliza para reducir su incertidumbre puede
acabar aumentándola. Nuestros resultados muestran como el error de pre-
dicción de los nuevos partidos es significativamente mayor que los tradi-
cionales e insensible a las soluciones clásicas para aumentar la precisión
de las encuestas, como el tamaño de la muestra, el método de muestreo, la
experiencia del encuestador, o la proximidad de la cita electoral. Además,
se observa que las empresas que desarrollan las encuestas realizan de
forma sistemática predicciones muy próximas a las que han realizado las
encuestas recientes de sus competidores. Finalmente, el sesgo editorial pa-
rece ser una variable relevante, especialmente en lo relativo a las predic-
ciones de los partidos tradicionales.
Palabras clave: encuestas electorales, partidos insurgentes, error de la en -
cuesta, España.
Clasificación JEL: D7 - Análisis de la toma de decisiones colectiva.
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